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"MAKE SURE YOU BELONG!": A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRATION 
REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDENTIAL AND 
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
Tamar De Waalt 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that civic integration requirements demanded for 
residency and citizenship rights in EU Member States are currently prone to 
have counterproductive societal outcomes, because their focus shifted from 
their impact on societal goals to judgments of individual desert. The notion 
of "integration" was originally perceived as a property of the whole society 
and described its functioning and social cohesion. However, this article 
shows how this concept has instead progressively become a property of 
individuals with non-EU, non-Western immigrant backgrounds and used to 
describe their compatibility with, and belonging to, society. This develop-
ment has created confusion about how to evaluate integration strategies. 
Integration policies in EU countries increasingly focus on selecting mi-
grants who "deserve" to belong. However, the pursuit of this goal - limiting 
belonging to those who earn it - often conflicts with upholding broader 
societal goals. Representative of these goals, for instance, is when integra-
tion requirements become burdensome and exclusionary, not least because 
those who fail to integrate are not expulsed but remain in society, albeit 
with precarious legal rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twenty years, many EU Member States have increasingly 
required third-country nationals' (hereinafter "TCNs") to undergo integra-
t L.L.B., L.L.M., Ph.D. University of Amsterdam (L.L.M. joint program with Co-
lumbia Law School), Assistant Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at Amster-
dam Law School, the Netherlands. Draft versions of the article were presented in 
Rotterdam (Section Seminar: Philosophy, Sociology, and Methodology, 11 September 
2017); Amsterdam (Paul Scholten Centre for Jurisprudence Colloquium, 7 October 
2015, Philosophy & Public Affairs Colloquium, 6 April 2016) and Montreal (ECPR 
General Conference 2015: Montreal, PoliticalTheory, Justice, and ImmigrationPolicy: 
New Developments). I would like to thank the organization committees and participants 
of those events. 
1. Individuals who are neither citizens of the EU Member States in which they are 
currently living or staying, nor of other Member States of the EU. 
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tion courses, language and citizenship tests, and oaths. Such integration re-
quirements are imposed as requirements at different stages of the 
immigration process: initial entry through obtaining permanent residency 
and/or naturalization. 2 In the scholarship, the proliferation of these integra-
tion requirements has been described as "among the most visible if not the 
most significant . . . policy change[ ]-3 in the context of accommodating 
migration in the recent history of Europe. 
The aim of this article is twofold. On one hand, it aims to explain that 
the burgeoning growth of integration requirements for TCNs as conditions 
for attaining residential and citizenship rights is underpinned by, and testi-
fies to, a broader conceptual shift regarding the notion of "integration" in 
European societies.4 On the other, it demonstrates that this conceptual shift 
has the pernicious effect of integration requirements for newcomers having 
counterproductive societal outcomes.5 Amongst other things, integration 
2. ELSPETH GUILD ET AL., ILLIBERAL LIBERAL STATES: IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP 
AND INTEGRATION IN THE EU (2009); RICKY VAN OERS, DESERVING CITIZENSHIP: CITI-
ZENSHIP TESTS IN GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (2014); 
YVES PASCOUAU, EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE, MEASURES AND RULES DEVELOPED IN 
THE EU MEMBER STATES REGARDING INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS -
COMPARATIVE REPORT (2014), available at <http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/ 
pub_6519_reportingintegrationschemesfinalversionpdf-en.pdf>; Rainer Baubock & 
Christian Joppke, How Liberalare Citizenship Tests? (Robert Schuman Centre for Ad-
vanced Studies, EUI Working Paper No. 41, 2010); Christian Joppke, Beyond National 
Models: Civic IntegrationPoliciesforImmigrants in Western Europe, 30 W. EUR. POL. 
1, 1-5 (2007); Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Illiberal Means to Liberal Ends? Under-
standing Recent ImmigrantIntegration Policies in Europe, 37 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION 
STUD. 861, 861-62 (2011); see generally Karin Borevi et al., The Civic Turn of Immi-
grant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian Welfare States, 5 COMP. MIGRATION 
STUD. 9 (2017). Most of these studies stress the potential of integration requirements to 
become illiberal (e.g. prescribe that immigrants must renounce certain cultural or relig-
ious identities as a condition for obtaining permanent residency or citizenship) or mech-
anisms of exclusion. In particular, it is often argued that integration requirements 
function as hidden tools of exclusion or are used to curtail the rights of immigrants. 
However, in this article I aim to show, inter alia, that more attention should be paid to 
the full puzzle of exclusionary discourses, constitutional limits, and empirical outcomes 
of these integration requirements to reveal and assess their broader societal effects. 
3. Sara Wallace Goodman, Fortifying Citizenship:Policy Strategiesfor Civic Inte-
gration in Western Europe, 64 WORLD POL. 659, 659 (2012). See also Tamar de Waal, 
Is the Post-multiculturalEra Pro-Diversity?,6 COMP. MIGRATION STUD. 15 (2018). 
4. This article does not reflect on whether this shift is exclusively European, or 
whether it may have also occurred in similar ways in other parts of the world, such as 
North America, New Zealand, or Australia. 
5. See generally Montserrat Gonziles Garibay & Peter de Cuyper, Is there an 
Evidence Basisfor ImmigrantIntegration Policies?, 8 NORDIC J. MIGRATORY RES. 15 
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strategies tend to preserve a subclass of vulnerable TCNs (e.g. traumatized 
refugees, illiterates) in society without equal rights and the public supervi-
sion that could adequately ameliorate their positions of disadvantage. 
The main contribution of this article is to elucidate how several EU 
Member States installed integration requirements over the last three decades 
that are prone to invest less, rather than more, in the integration of TCNs, 
while immigrant integration has been one of the most significant debated 
features of political life in European countries. In essence, this paradoxical 
outcome is the result of discussions of "individualized" integration concep-
tualizations, which often occur in European countries as potential public 
problems arise when newcomers arrive in society. This involves the idea 
that persons with (non-EU, non-Western) immigrant backgrounds must be 
"personally integrated" to be seen as meriting (full) public concern. This 
development connects societal challenges related to immigration to national 
identity and personal belonging (e.g. "Has Farid succeeded in becoming a 
real Dane or not?"). However, the most effective integration strategies rec-
ognize integration as an ongoing set of shared issues that require proactive 
public attention (e.g. equal participation, enhanced language levels in soci-
ety, shared senses of belonging, democratic socialization, etc.). 
To demonstrate this, the article will first turn to the EU Directives that 
enable Member States to implement integration measures and explore do-
mestic rules pertaining to integration requirements as conditions for attain-
ing increased rights. Then, the conceptual shift in Europe vis-A-vis the 
concept of "integration"-moving from a "collective" to an "individual-
ized" notion-will be discussed. Following that, its parallels with and con-
nections to the legal integration requirements in force in various EU 
Member States are examined. Finally, in Europe, integration requirements 
for residency and citizenship that have counterproductive societal effects 
have increasingly become accepted. 
Before proceeding, three brief clarifications must be made. First, the 
ambition of this article is not to academically support the "collective" per-
spective on integration: it remains largely agnostic as to whether, all things 
considered, it offers the best sociological explanation or normative meta-
phor to describe the functioning of a society. Instead, it aims to document 
certain effects of the trend towards individualized integration conceptual-
izations in Europe on integration policies. 
(2018). So far, there is no full-fledged evidence basis for the effectiveness of integration 
policies. Accordingly, this article is a valuable contribution to the academic literature, 
as it engages with the potential risks and discusses the most salient ramifications of the 
relatively novel integration policies in EU countries. 
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Second, this article does not claim that this shift has manifested itself 
with equal force, or in exactly the same way, in all European countries. For 
example, Anita B6cker and Tineke Strik, observe that (what I call) "individ-
ualized" conceptions of integration have been invoked most explicitly in the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark. 6 However, as will be demonstrated, 
policy tendencies towards individualized integration are definitely not lim-
ited to these countries. On that account, the main ambition of this article is 
not to give detailed descriptions of all policy changes in Member States. 
Instead, it aims to highlight the risks of this broader development. This is 
relevant for Member States that have already enacted (excessively) individ-
ualized integration requirements as well as for Member States that have not 
(yet). 
Third, the analysis of this article broadly confirms the observation of 
several commentators who have noted that the changes in integration and 
citizenship policies in Europe included a departure from the idea of natural-
ization as a tool for integration to the idea of naturalization as a rewardfor 
integration. 7 It also extends it by highlighting the underlying conceptual 
shift that has reinforced this legal development. This, I contend, is a valua-
ble contribution, as it allows us to reflect in more detail on the outcomes of 
such integration measures. 
I. THE EXPANSION OF INTEGRATION REQUIREMENTS IN MULTIPLE 
EU MEMBER STATES 
This Part discusses the EU directives and national laws that govern the 
integration requirements in Member States and TCNs and, where necessary, 
summarizes the relevant case law. 
In relation to integration policies and naturalization laws for non-EU 
immigrants residing in Member States, there is no wide-ranging European 
harmonization regime in force, but there are several non-binding soft regu-
6. Anita Bocker & Tineke Strik, Language and Knowledge Tests for Permanent 
Residence Rights: Help Or Hindrancefor Integration?, 13 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 
157, 167 (2011). Bocker and Strik clearly demonstrate how electoral shifts towards 
populist, anti-immigrant parties have put mainstream parties under pressure to adopt 
discourses and positions that aim to limit access to permanent residence for "well-inte-
grated" immigrants. In other words, in public discourse in these countries, "integration" 
is increasingly not a societal property, but an individual property that assesses the be-
longing of these individuals to society. 
7. Sara Wallace Goodman, Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? 
Identifying, Categorisingand Comparing Civic Integration Policies, 36 J.ETHNIC & 
MIGRATION STUD. 753, 765 (2010); see, e.g., VAN OERS, supra note 2, at 51. 
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latory tools.8 The two pieces of binding supranational legislation that ex-
plicitly grant Member States the competence to enact (mandatory) 
integration requirements are the Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 Sep-
tember 2003 on the right to family reunification 9 (hereinafter "Family Di-
rective") and the Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term re-
sidents10 (hereinafter "LTR Directive"). These directives give Member 
States the option to condition family reunification and the acquisition of a 
long-term resident status after five years of uninterrupted residence for 
TCNs, respectively, on integration requirements. It is left to individual 
Member States to decide whether to implement such measures. The Euro-
pean Commission and European Court of Justice (hereinafter "CJEU") see 
to it that national policies respect the rules set by these directives.11 
Since the enactment of these directives, there has been a clear trend 
towards formalized testing of language skills, national civic knowledge, and 
value commitments as prerequisites for family migration, obtaining perma-
nent residency, and gaining access to naturalization procedures. 12 These 
measures have been predominately 13 aimed at family migrants and refugees; 
8. See CommissionCommunicationon Immigration,Integrationand Employment, 
COM (2003) 336 final (May 5, 2003); see also Press Release, Council of the European 
Union, Justice and Home Affairs (Nov. 19, 2004). 
9. Council Directive (EC) No. 2003/86 of 22 September 2003, art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L 
251/12) 1; see also GUILD ET AL., supra note 2, at 14. 
10. Council Directive (EC) No. 2003/109 of 25 November 2003, art. 5, 2004 O.J. 
(L 16/44) 1. Denmark is also not bound by this Directive. 
11. Saskia Bonjour, The Transfer of Pre-DepartureIntegration Requirementsfor 
Family Migrants Among Member States of the European Union, 2 COMP. MIGRATION 
STUD. 203, 211 (2014). 
12. See Goodman, supranote 7; see also Kees Groenendijk, Pre-DepartureInte-
grationStrategies in the European Union: Integrationor Immigration Policy?, 13 EUR. 
J. MIGRATION & L. 1 (2011); see also Christian Joppke & Tobias Eule, Civic Integra-
tion in Europe: Continuity versus Discontinuity, in HANDBOOK OF MIGRATION AND 
SOCIAL POLICY 343 (Gary F. Freeman & Nikola Mirilovic eds., 2016). 
13. There are virtually no legal venues for non-high skilled labour to EU countries 
anymore, and high-skilled labour migrants are often exempted from integration require-
ments. Furthermore, internal EU immigrants cannot be obliged to satisfy integration 
requirements, given their EU citizenship. However, in the case that migrants of these 
groups volitionally seek the nationality of the EU Member State in which they reside, 
they must also complete the integration requirements for naturalization. See, e.g., Julia 
Mourdo Permoser, Civic Integration as Symbolic Politics: Insights from Austria, 14 
EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 173, 186 (2012). 
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Member States are required to admit non-EU migrants based on EU and 
international laws. 
14 
A. Family Directive 
If we unpack the different types of integration requirements further, we 
see first that in response to the Family Directive, five EU countries installed 
"integration abroad" requirements.1 5 These measures require family mem-
bers or spouses of TCNs to pass an integration and/or language test in their 
country of origin at the local embassy of the receiving Member State. 
16 
Mostly, these requirements test minimal levels of language acquisition and/ 
or knowledge of their receiving societies. The arguments used in political 
debates on these pre-departure integration requirements and their conditions 
vary in the several EU countries that have installed them and altered them 
over time. During national parliamentary debates, they have generally been 
defended as facilitating the successful integration of those to be included. 
Muslim migrant women in particular were mentioned relatively often as a 
specific target group. The pre-departure tests were expected to ensure that 
fewer of them would eventually become a burden on the receiving welfare 
state. 17 
Importantly, from a legal perspective, the integration measures abroad 
for family migrants allowed by the Family Directive are not supposed to 
function as a tool for selecting migrants, but for promoting family migra-
tion.' 8 For example, in 2014, the Commission explained that the Family 
Directive does not permit integration requirements that constitute a measure 
14. Family migrants are admitted based on their right to family life. See, e.g., 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 137, at Art. 8; Council Directive, supra note 9. Residency 
rights are protected by the non-refoulement principle enshrined in Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, at Art. 33. 
15. The Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Austria, and France. 
16. KARIN DE VRIs, INTEGRATION AT THE BORDER: THE DUTCH Acr ON INTE-
GRATION ABROAD AND INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW (2013). 
17. See, e.g., Tineke Strik et al., The INTEC Project:Synthesis Report, in WHICH 
INTEGRATION POLICIES FOR MIGRANTS? INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EU AND ITs MEM-
BER STATES 285, 401 (Yves Pascouau & Tineke Strik eds., 2010); P.W.A. SCHOLTEN ET 
AL., PROSINT Comparative Reports, Integration from Abroad? Perception and Impacts 
of Pre-Entry Tests for Third-Country Nationals (Mar 25, 2015), available at http://re-
search.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project-material/PROSINT/Reports/WP 
4_CompRepFinal submitted.pdf. 
18. VAN OERS, supra note 2, at 132. 
2018-2019] "Make Sure You Belong!" 
"that limits the possibility of family reunification."' 9 In addition, the CJEU 
criticized the Dutch integration requirements in 2015 in its judgment in K 
and A and ruled that integration requirements should not undermine the 
objective of the Family Directive, which is to promote family migration. 
20 
B. Long Term Residency (LTR) Directive 
Turning to the LTR Directive, we see that it gives Member States the 
discretion to make permanent residency after five years of uninterrupted 
residence contingent on integration requirements stipulated by national 
laws. However, the Commission is clear that these requirements do not 
serve to select TCNs who are eligible for permanent residency but o facili-
tate integration processes, and that, in principle, TCNs should be able to 
obtain permanent residency after five years of uninterrupted residence. 21 In 
particular, the Commission clarified in a 2003 report on the application of 
the Directive for the European Parliament and the Council that Member 
States should ensure that the requirements are "in line with the purpose of 
the Directive," which is "fostering the integration of [long-term residents]," 
and to "take due account of the general principles of EU law, such as the 
principle of preserving its effectiveness ("effet utile") and the proportional-
ity principle. ' 22 Similarly, the CJEU ruled in 2015 in the P and S case that 
the obligation to pass civic integration examination is compliant with the 
LTR Directive as long as it does not "jeopardize the objectives pursued by 
the Directive" of which the principal objective is "the integration of TCNs 
23 
who are settled on a long-term basis in the Member State. 
19. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliamentand the 
Council on Guidancefor Application of Directive2003/86/EC on the Right to Family 
Reunification (Apr. 3, 2014), available at <http://-www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/ 
2014_2019/documents/com/comcom(2014)0210_/comcom(2014)0210_en.pdf> 
20. RvS 9 juli 2015, C-153/14, at § 51 (Minister van Buitenlandse zaken/K and A) 
(Neth.). 
21. The key rule of the LTR Directive can be found in Article 4, paragraph 1, 
which provides that "Member States shall grant long-term resident status to third-coun-
try nationals who have resided legally and continuously within its territory for five 
years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant application." Council Direc-
tive 2003/109 Art. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 16/44) 1 (EC). 
22. Report from the Commission to the EuropeanParliamentand the Council on 
the applicationof Directive 2003/109/ECconcerning the status of third-countrynation-
als who are long-term residents, COM, at (2011) 585 final (Sept. 28, 2011), available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homea fl irs /files/e-library/documents/poli-
cies/legal-migration/pdf/long-term-residents/1 en-act partlv62.pdf. 
23. CRvB 28 januari 2015, C-579/13, at §45-46 (P and S/Commissie Sociale 
Zekerheid Breda and College van Burgermeester en Wethouders van de gemeente Am-
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Notwithstanding, after the LTR Directive came into force, a vast ma-
jority of Member States made the acquisition of long-term residency for 
TCNs strictly dependent on integration requirements such as language tests, 
civic tests, and loyalty oaths. 24 In turn, if TCNs fail to meet these condi-
tions, the established sanctions by national laws are the imposition of fines, 
the lowering or withdrawal of social benefits, or the non-renewal or with-
drawal of residence permits. 
Of these sanctions, the refusal to grant or even the withdrawal of resi-
dence rights and expulsion are obviously most far-reaching. Yet, if we as-
sess these punitive measures, we see that in Member States that installed 
them, such as Austria in 2003 and the Netherlands in 2013, no TCNs to date 
have been forced to leave these countries on the sole ground of not satisfy-
ing all integration requirements.25 The reason for this is that the novel 
mandatory integration requirements based on the LTR Directive mainly af-
fect family migrants and refugees, immigrant groups that are strongly pro-
tected against deportation based on EU laws and international human right 
norms. In other words, the most drastic result for TCNs who fail to meet 
integration requirements for permanent residency is in fact not expulsion. 
Rather, TCNs are, as Sarah Goodman and Matthew Wright put it, "placed 
stelveen [Committee on Social Security Breda and Mayor and Executive Board Am-
stelveen]) (Neth.). 
24. YVES PASCOUAU, EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE, MEASURES AND RULES DEVEL-
OPED IN THE EU MEMBER STATES REGARDING INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY NA-
TIONALS - COMPARATIVE REPORT 92 (2014), available at <http://www.epc.eu/docu 
ments/uploads/pub_6519_reportintegrationschemesfinalversionpdf-en.pdf>; Bocker & 
Strik, supra note 6. According to a report by the International Organization for Migra-
tion, in the limited period between 2003 and 2007 no less than thirteen Member States 
of the European Union introduced new mandatory integration requirements for perma-
nent residency in response to the LTR Directive. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF 
MIGRATION, LAWS FOR LEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE 27 EU MEMBER STATES (2009), 
available at http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/i ml_16.pdf. See also Mourdo 
Permoser, supra note 13, at 174. Today, the EU Member States that have obligatory 
integration requirements for permanent residency are Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. 
25. ELLES BESSELSEN & BETrY DE HART, VERBLIJFSRECHTELIJKE CONSEQUENTIES 
VAN DE WET INBURGERING. EEN ONDERZOEK NAAR DE ERVARINGEN VAN MIGRANTEN 
IN AMSTERDAM [THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTEGRATION ACT ON THE RIGHT OF REsi-
DENCE. A RESEARCH ON THE EXPERIENCES OF MIGRANTS IN AMSTERDAM] 3 (2014); 
Mourdo Permoser, supra note 13, at 193-98. 
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in a feedback loop of conditionality. '26 These TCNs often receive fines and 
must reside in provisional legal statuses with temporary residency rights for 
longer periods of time. Integration requirements for permanent residency 
thus mainly affect the types of legal residency status (often connected to 
packages of social rights) that parts of the residing population possess, but 
do not change the physical composition of the residing population-that is, 
who lives within society at large.
27 
C. Naturalization 
There is no overarching set of EU regulations for citizenship that ap-
plies to all European Member States. As a result, understanding who can 
become a national within a Member State requires analysis and case studies 
of specific national laws.28 Nevertheless, the explanatory report of the Euro-
pean Convention on Nationality stresses that its provision stipulating that 
the permissible period of ten years of lawful and habitual residence before 
naturalization reflects a common European standard, as most European 
countries already require a period between five and ten years of residence. 
29 
For TCNs in EU states it is never obligatory to naturalize, as they can 
choose to (merely) obtain or retain permanent residency. It is not attractive 
for persons to naturalize if, for example, they want to keep the citizenship 
of their country of birth and the receiving state does not tolerate dual citi-
zenship, or if integration requirements for naturalization are deemed to be 
too onerous. 
I. INTEGRATION: OLD AND NEW 
In the following Part, I expand upon the shift that has supported the 
legal changes described above concerning the very idea of how integration 
is understood in public policy, public debate, and daily speech in Europe. 
26. Sara Wallace Goodman & Matthew Wright, Does Mandatory Integration Mat-
ter? Effects of Civic Requirements on Immigrant Socio-Economic and PoliticalOut-
comes, 41 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1885, 1903 (2015). 
27. Sune Lagaard, Immigration,Social Cohesion,and Naturalization,10 ETHNici-
TIES 452, 459 (2010). Legaard demonstrates that arguments related to social cohesion 
and integration function to justify restrictive naturalization requirements, but that stan-
dards concerned with generalized social trust are not connected to issues of naturaliza-
tion at all (because the composition of society remains the same with or without such 
requirements). 
28. See, e.g., 2 AcQUIsITION AND Loss OF NATIONALITY: POLICIES AND TRENDS IN 
15 EUROPEAN STATES, 11-18 (Rainer Baubdck et al. eds., 2006). 
29. Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality 51, May 31, 
2017, E.T.S. No. 166. 
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The contemporary individualized conceptualization of integration will be 
elaborated upon more extensively, given its current ramifications on public 
integration policy. This Part thus focuses on the contours of the shift, and 
the next Part highlights and discusses several real-world examples that 
demonstrate its reality and consequences in several EU Member States. 
A. Integrationas a Condition of Society 
The notion of "integration" traditionally began with how the concept 
was coined and employed in the functionalist tradition in sociology by 
scholars such as Pmile Durkheim or Talcott Parsons. 30 This does not mean 
that public commentators or policy makers referred to specific thinkers, nor 
that these thinkers themselves agreed on what integration entails, 31 but that 
they discussed integration as a notion applicable to collectives. More specif-
ically, "integration" was used to discuss how societiesmaintain their social 
cohesion and keep individuals and groups connected in networks of social 
relations. It rested on the assumption that modern societies form a unity, a 
collective ensemble composed of a combination of individuals and sub-
groups that are in constant reciprocal processes of communal socialization. 
Within these processes, the state was often seen as the center of coordina-
tion.32 Concerning this perspective on integration, Michel Wieviorka writes: 
This sociology . . . regards social integration and subscription to 
shared values and the density of interaction between members of the 
groups or society as far more important than the analysis of individu-
als as such.... Durkheimian or functionalist sociology ... aims at 
the integration of individuals in society and the integration of society 
as a whole.33 
30. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Turner, Emile Durkheim's Theory of Integrationin Dif-
ferentiatedSocial Systems, 24 PAC. Soc. REV. 379 (1981). 
31. Durkheim, for example, searched extensively for shared normative values 
such as a common will to live together, while others (such as Parsons) searched more 
empirically how subgroups systematically interacted in various spheres of society. See 
KENNETH ALLAN, EXPLORATIONS IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: SEEING THE 
SOCIAL WORLD 136 (2005); see also UTA GERHARDT, THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF 
TALCorr PARSONS: METHODOLOGY AND AMERICAN ETHOS 33-34 (2016). For another 
example, see David Lockwood, Social Integrationand System Integration,in EXPLORA-
TIONS IN SOCIAL CHANGE 244 (G. K. Zollschan & H. W. Hirsch eds., 1964). 
32. Veit Bader, Cohesion, Unity and Stability in Modern Societies, in TiHE MANY 
FACES OF INDIVIDUALISM 107, 132 (Anton van Harskamp & Albert W. Musschenga 
eds., 2001). 
33. Michel Wieviorka, A Critique of Integration,21 IDENTITIES 633, 635 (2014). 
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Theoretically, the term "integration" was opposed to social distances, 
group segregations, or forms of personal alienation and anomie. Note that 
this implies that from this holistic perspective, both groups and individuals 
would surely be relevant to debates on integration. However, crucially, it 
discussed them as potentially participating in societal systems in such a way 
that society is perceived as functioning as an organic holistic entity.
34 Put 
differently, integration concerns individuals and subgroups and their posi-
tion in societal networks, but not in the sense that only they should be influ-
enced separately or "individually integrated." Integration describes the 
social mechanisms that keep all individuals and groups interacting as a 
whole, which is always more than the sum of its parts. 
On that account, the political ideal of "integration" initially had two 
crucial elements. First, the notion entailed a process of communal socializa-
tion of all its members. Second, the notion was applied to and was a prop-
erty of society as a whole. 
B. Integrationas a Condition of Individuals 
These two elements of integration have gradually moved to the back-
ground in policy documents, public debates, and daily speech. Today, it has 
become uncommon and even strange to discuss whether, say, the "Dutch 
society" or "Austrian society" is integrated or not, while it has become 
rather common to discuss the personal integration of, for example, Hussein 
or Fatima. Put differently, if integration is discussed nowadays, it is most 
likely that the conversation is about non-Western, non-EU immigrants and 
their descendants and focuses on their compatibility with a created image of 
"society." 
On a more abstract level, the concept of "integration" within contem-
porary Europe became an umbrella term for the idea that non-EU and non-
Western immigrants and their descendants must be integrated, perceived as 
a personal condition for deserving a rightful place "inside" society. 35 This 
34. INGER FURSETH & PAL REPSTAD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
RELIGION: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 34 (2006). 
35. Id. My analysis here leans heavily on the terminology developed by Willem 
Schinkel, who describes the current-day perspective on integration as an "extra-legal 
normative concept." For this reason, he argues that we should abandon the term "inte-
gration" because it has become an illegitimate term, at least in Europe, as it involves a 
stigmatizing double standard for immigrants. As will become clear, I share this concern 
in part because "integration" is indeed often interpreted in prejudiced ways (that assume 
that nonimmigrant citizens are always already integrated, whereas immigrants are at 
best conditionally integrated into society). However, I do not believe that changing a 
word automatically solves the problem of structural biases against certain groups. 
Therefore, I continue using the term in the hope that through discussion we can clarify 
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development has multiple effects, 36 but three interconnected implications 
are most relevant for understanding the relationship between the redefini-
tion of integration and the proliferation of legal integration requirements as 
conditions for obtaining expanded rights in a large number of Member 
States. 
The first implication is that it creates an image of society in which 
certain persons may be perpetually physically present in society, but, even 
after decades, might nevertheless symbolically stand "outside of society" as 
non-integrated. In the terminology of Bridget Anderson, this symbolic ex-
clusion suggests that within society, seen as the mere sum of all residing 
individuals, a "moral community" exists of persons who are naturally per-
ceived as "the protectors of good citizenship," 37 while others are only con-
tingently recognized as equal members of society based on standards of 
worthiness selectively applied to them. Specifically, persons without non-
EU, non-Western immigrant backgrounds are seen as automatically belong-
ing to their society and unconditionally entitled to their citizenship status, 
while persons with these immigrant backgrounds are perpetually deemed 
inside or outside of society based on individualized standards of integra-
tion.38 And if the latter group is seen as personally "integrated," they are 
the issues and develop a more adequate use of it. See WILLEM SCr-INKEL, IMAGINED 
SOCIETIES: A CRITIQUE OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE (2017); see 
also Willem Schinkel, The Virtualizationof Citizenship, 36 CRITICAL Soc. 265 (2010). 
36. For example, an illegal immigrant in France, Mamoudou Gassame ("Spider-
Man"), miraculously saved a small child that almost fell of a balcony, received or 
"earned" French citizenship because his act of immense bravery. His reception of citi-
zenship was "faithful to the values of solidarity of our republic, [and] should open the 
door to him to our national community." Kim Willsher, 'Spider-Man' of Paristo get 
French Citizenship After Child Rescue, THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2018, 3:09 AM), 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/28/spider-man-of-paris-to-get-french-
citizenship-after-rescuing-child> 
37. BRIDGET ANDERSON, Us AND THEM? THE DANGEROUS POLITIcs OF IMMIGRA-
TION CONTROL 6 (2013). Anderson shows that immigration status is not solely about 
legal technicalities, but it is also about status in the sense of value, worth and honor-
that is, who is excluded or included in the "community of value." 
38. Within this modem conceptualization and discourse of integration, whether 
evaluated persons with non-EU, non-Western origins have citizenship rights or not is 
not the most relevant issue. In public discourses, citizens with such backgrounds also 
can be framed in terms of successful or unsuccessful integration; in other words, as 
standing inside or outside of society. If nonimmigrant and immigrant citizens are less 
successful, this has only a negative impact on their position in the fabric of belonging to 
the national community for the immigrant citizen. For example, if immigrant citizens 
are unemployed or criminals, they are looked upon as undeserving of their citizenship 
and condemned for unjustifiably burdening "our" national welfare state. It is suggested 
that they should "return to their own country." However, citizens without immigrant 
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perceived as deserving to belong to society and to be worthy of their 
citizenship. 
The second implication is the symbolic possibility that whole groups 
of individuals with non-EU, non-Western immigrant backgrounds can 
"stand outside of society" due to their personal lack of integration facili-
tates. This possibility is a trend in which negative societal outcomes or sta-
tistics regarding immigrants and their descendants are qualified as 
integration issues pertaining exclusively to (subgroups of) individuals 
rather than societal issues. This is a powerful mechanism. To explain, the 
contemporary conception of integration presumes that if persons with non-
EU and non-Western backgrounds are, for instance, unemployed, 
homophobic, criminal, a school dropout, or a religious extremist, that they 
are insufficiently integrated and hence stand outside of the society they re-
side in. 
Consequently, although obviously untrue, it is implicitly presupposed 
that "inside the real society," no unemployment, homophobia, crime, school 
dropouts, or religious extremism exists. Individualized integration concep-
tualizations that assume that persons with non-EU backgrounds may or may 
not "fit in" in society produce idealized images of "the real society" (e.g. as 
fully harmonious, democratic, secular,39 and reinforced by a list of suppos-
edly unchangeable national traditions, values, and customs). As a result, a 
public standard emerges that recognizes undesirable statistics-say, high 
percentages of crime, undemocratic attitudes or unemployment rates-if 
they concern non-EU, non-Western immigrants. These standards do not rec-
ognize these statistics as societal issues that deserve public concern, but as 
individual integration issues pertaining to certain persons who do not be-
long to society. 
The third and last implication of perceiving integration as an individu-
alized condition of immigrants and their descendants is that it attributes the 
responsibility for success or failure of integration one-sidedly to the behav-
ior, attitudes, efforts, or qualities of these immigrants and their descendants. 
Given that integration is not a property of society, but a personal condition 
to be met by these immigrants, their potential successful participation in 
public and social life demonstrates only their personal degree of integra-
backgrounds who are unemployed or engage in criminal behavior may be regarded as a 
nuisance, unlucky, malignant, or lazy-but, crucially, never as less of a citizen for be-
ing so. See, e.g., Tamar De Waal, Conditional Belonging: A Legal-Philosophical In-
quiry into Integration Requirements for Immigrants in Europe (2017) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam) (on file with author). 
39. Or at least culturally, based on a (secularized) Western strand of Christianity. 
See, e.g., Per Mouritsen & Tore Vincents Olsen, Denmark Between Liberalism and 
Nationalism, 36 ETHNIC & RAcL. STUD. 691, 703 (2013). 
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tion. Therefore, the qualification of non-integration often leads to less rather 
than more public concern for improving the observed negative and undesir-
able statistics, as the qualification discursively establishes that the involved 
persons with a non-EU immigrant background are in fact alienated from the 
"real society." More specifically, if in Denmark immigrant turns out toan 
be "non-integrated" because he or she does not speak the language well (or 
worse), he simultaneously becomes less Danish or a "not-quite-real" 
Dane.4° For this reason, the "real Danish society" is not affected in terms of 
integration by these statistics, let alone held accountable or co-responsible 
for the social conditions that produced this kind of behavior. Integration is a 
condition of individual persons, so it cannot be a shared public problem. 
On that account, the modern conceptual understanding of "integration" 
or "being integrated" also contains two crucial aspects. First, it is an indi-
vidualized condition personally applicable to non-EU immigrants with non-
Western origins and their descendants. Second, it is used to evaluate and 
express whether they deserve to belong to, or are worthy to receive the 
citizenship of, the European societies in which they live based on their com-
patibility with idealized societal standards attributed to the "real society." 
11. INDIVIDUALIZED INTEGRATION AND INTEGRATION 
REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPE: EXPLORING THE LINKS 
This Part focuses on the relationship between the changing public per-
ception and discourse of integration in Europe as described in Part Mi and 
the integration requirements in Member States as discussed in Part H. It 
begins with the case of the Netherlands, a country that has explicitly func-
tioned as a model for other EU governments in the context of integration 
requirements for TCNs.41 Then it will highlight developments in other 
states that illustrate the relationship between the conceptual and legal shifts 
concerning integration in Europe. 
The Netherlands was the first European country to implement a 
mandatory integration program with the introduction of the Newcomers In-
tegration Act in 1998. The government provided this program at no cost to 
the participants and consisted of a 500-hour language education course and 
a 100-hour orientation course regarding the labor market and society. 42 This 
bill was a response to a report by the Dutch Scientific Council of Govern-
40. MIKKEL RYTTER, FAMILY UPHEAVAL: GENERATION, MOBILITY AND RELATED-
NESS AMONG PAKISTANI MIGRANTS IN DENMARK 116 (2013). 
41. Ines Michalowski, Integration Programmesfor Newcomers - a Dutch Model 
for Europe?, in 24 IMIS-BEITRAGE (SPECIAL ISSUE) (Anita Bocker et al. eds., 2004). 
42. VAN OERS, supra note 2, at 48-49. 
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ment Policy, the WRR,4 3 which concluded in 1989 that "too many allochto-
nous live in a marginal position; their participation in society is insufficient. 
Therefore, it is unacceptable that this situation endures.., based on reasons 
of social justice ...for all residents." 44 The mandatory integration demands 
were not tied to rights of entry, renewals of visas, or naturalization. The 
government defended the integration demands as emancipating and improv-
ing the too-long neglected position of certain immigrant groups in the whole 
of society. Moreover, support of integration processes was seen as a public 
responsibility, and the term "integration" was applied to all Dutch members 
of society. 
45 
This all changed rapidly. In 2003, the legal link was established be-
tween civic integration requirements and issues of citizenship with the in-
troduction of a formalized naturalization test.4 6 Soon after, the 
naturalization test was replaced by a series of civic integration exams, to be 
completed within three years. These exams are required to obtain perma-
nent residency rights. 47 During the same period (in 2006), the Dutch gov-
ernment was the first to develop the "civic integration exam abroad" for 
family migrants.48 In Parliament, the Dutch government explicitly described 
these requirements, as we have seen, as "selection criteria" with the purpose 
not to admit those who fail them, to restrict the immigration of "non-in-
tegratable" migrants. 49 In 2013, the Dutch state again heavily revised its 
integration trajectory. 50 Not only did it stop monitoring and publicly fund-
ing integration courses to prepare for the integration exams, but it also cre-
ated the possibility that not completing the required integration demands 
would lead to losing residency rights and deportation from the territory.
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43. The WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [The Nether-
lands Scientific Council for Government Policy]) is an independent advisory body for 
the Dutch government and is concerned with the direction of government policy in the 
long term. 
44. WWR, ALLOCHTONENBELEID [Immigrant Policy] 10 (1989). 
45. VAN OERS, supra note 2, at 15. 
46. Id. at 60. 
47. Wet Inburgering, Stb. 2006, p. 625. 
48. Wet Inburgering in het Buitenland [Integration Act Abroad], Stb. 2006, p. 28; 
DE VRTES, supra note 16; Groenendijk, supra note 12, at 11-13. The Netherlands de-
cided to exempt "Western Countries," meaning that non-EU citizens from EEA States, 
the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea are not 
required to pass an integration and language exam before departure. 
49. SCHOLTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 10. 
50. Wijzigingswet Wet Inburgering [Amendment Act Integration Act], Stb. 2013, 
p. 226. 
51. BESSELSEN & DE HART, supra note 25. 
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Additionally, in 2017, the Dutch Government extended the "duty to 
integrate" with the signing of a Participation Declaration, requiring new-
comers to become familiar with and commit themselves to the core values 
of the Netherlands, such as freedom, equality and solidarity. 52 Not signing 
the declaration leads to fines (between -340 and C 1250). In addition, to-
day, TCNs have to find language and integration lessons at private compa-
nies and pay for this education. To be able to afford the integration 
53 trajectory, TCNs can apply for a social loan up to C 1000. 
The new integration laws were advertised with slogans such as "Make 
sure you belong!" 54 and "To stay is to participate. '55 These slogans clearly 
conveyed that the new narrative behind Dutch integration strategies be-
came: TCNs must, without much outside help or public financial support, 
prove their personal integration by fulfilling series of requirements pre-
scribed by the receiving state in order to be deserving of belonging and 
(allegedly) staying in the Netherlands. "Integration" became increasingly 
framed as the sole responsibility and duty of the TCN, who should be "self-
reliant; ' 56 secure residency and full rights came to be regarded as a privi-
lege for those who are deemed to be "well-integrated." 57 
52. See Rijksoverheid [The Government of the Netherlands], FirstChamberfor 
participationdeclarationfor newcomers, (Jun. 20, 2017, 2:07 PM), <https://www.rijks 
overheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/06/20/ook-eerste-kamer-voor-participatieverklaring-
nieuwkomers> 
53. See De Waal, supra note 39, at 60-61: "If refugees pass all requirements 
within the given three years, their debts are cancelled. However, for family migrants, 
this is never the case: they always have to pay this integration loan." 
54. Rijksoverheid, Zorg dat je erbij hoort! [Make Sure You Fit In!], http://rijk-
soverheid.archiefweb.eu/ (last visited May 31, 2017). 
55. Rijksoverheid, Kabinet: blijven is meedoen [Staying is Participating](Nov. 
27, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu/ (last visited May 31, 2017). 
56. Saskia Bonjour & Jan Willem Duyvendak, The "Migrant with Poor Pros-
pects": Racialized Intersections of Class and Culture in Dutch Civic Integration De-
bates, 41 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 882, 886 (2018). 
57. De Waal, supra note 39, at 57-59. Being "well integrated" also means that 
newcomers increasingly are expected to abandon habits and traditions that are consid-
ered problematic from a majoritarian perspective. See Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law 
Implications of Ritual Circumcisions,22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. (forthcoming 2019) 
for a critical discussion of this implicit requirement. Cf Amy Bartholomew, Human 
Rights and Post-Imperialism: Arguing for a Deliberative Legitimation of Human 
Rights, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 25, 37 (2003); Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, 
Cleaning Our Own House: Exotic and Familial Human Rights Violations, 4 BUFF. 
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 123, 132 (1998); Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Hands off My Pudendum:A 
Critique of the Human Rights Approach to Female Genital Ritual, 15 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L. J. 243, 253 (2011). 
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The individualized concept of integration in the Netherlands, both in 
discourse and actual policy, became highly visible. Integration policies 
were no longer aimed at upholding the public concern "social justice for all 
residents," or public societal goals along those lines. Instead, the eligibility 
of newcomers for full legal membership rights became connected to a con-
cept of individualized integration that must be personally achieved. To 
TCNs the message is: first demonstrate that you can personally integrate, 
that is, that you are compatible with "Us"- then you may belong. 
As mentioned, this Dutch history regarding integration policies does 
not stand on its own; for example, we see a similar trend in Austria. Though 
originating from heated political debates, in 2002 the first version of the 
Integrationsvereinbarungstated that it aimed at offering TCNs sufficient 
knowledge of the German language in order to uphold collective societal 
goals, such as "to be able to participate in the social, economic and cultural 
life in Austria. '58 The first bill required the attendance of a subsidized 100-
hour integration course (fully-subsidized if completed within one and a half 
years). By 2011, however, Austria had three different language tests and 
requirements, and today immigrants must pass a pre-departure test, a test 
after two years of residence, and another after five years as conditions for 
the acquisition of a long-term residence permit. After entry, if the immi-
grant fails to pass the second test within two years, financial sanctions fol-
low and eventually deportation (allegedly). Moreover, according to this 
integration law, the government no longer provides for subsidized courses 
or materials. 5
9 
In France, in 1998, voluntary half-day classes for certain categories of 
newcomers (mostly non-Western family migrants) were introduced by the 
socialist Jospin government; these were later in 2003 by the Contrats 
d'accueil et de l'intdgration,entailing 500 hours of French language in-
° struction. 6 Today, passing the requirements of this "integration contract" is 
obligatory for the renewal of residence permits, including obtaining a 10-
year card that establishes permanent residency rights. In the political de-
bate, this policy was defended with the argument that a newcomer-partic-
58. FREMDENGESETZ [version of Dec. 31, 2002] BUNDESGESETZBLATr [BGBL] 
No. 75/1997 (Austria). 
59. Mourdo Permoser, supra note 13, at 187; Verordnung der Bundesministerin 
ffir Inneres, mit der die Verordnung uber die Integrationsvereinbarung verandert wird. 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 205/2011. 
60. HAUT CONSEIL A L'INTE'GRATION, LES PARCOURS D'INTEGRATION (2001); 
Joppke, supranote 2, at 9. 
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ularly if a family migrant-should be obliged to "insert herself in our 
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society." 
Paolo Cuttita writes that Italy "followed the example of other Euro-
pean countries" by shifting from "structural integration of immigrants" to 
policies concerning their cultural integration including "the acceptance of 
purported national and European values." 62 Today, Italy requires residents 
with temporary residency to sign an "integration contract," and meet a cer-
tain level of integration within a period of two or three years. If TCNs do 
not succeed, they are allegedly sanctioned with expulsion. 63 The UK ob-
serves a comparable series of policy changes and academic commentators 
concur that Britain increasingly works with models of "earned" citizenship 
for integration. 64 In this context, Bridget Byrne observes that the integration 
tests in the UK became underpinned by the individualized conception of 
integration as they are meant to assess "a display of the suitability and pro-
priety of potential citizens who have shown a commitment to learning and 
the potential to integrate" and "are often regarded in popular discourse as a 
test of Britishness." 
In 2016, after admitting over a million refugees, Germany altered its 
integration requirements in order to send the political message that ob-
taining permanent residency is not possible for refugees who do not inte-
grate well. In this context, Minister Thomas Maizere (CDU) said "language, 
work and saying 'yes' to our system of values: those are the three crucial 
factors for integration. ' 65 Again, integration was defined as an individual 
condition of immigration. A person's characteristics, behaviour and outlook 
determined their legal entitlement to stay. 
61. HAUT CONSEIL A L'INTEGRATION, LE CONTRAT ET L'INTEGRATION (2003); 
Goodman, supra note 7, at 760. 
62. Paolo Cuttitta, Mandatory Integration Measures and Differential Inclusion: 
The ItalianCase, 17 J.INT'L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 289, 289-90 (2016). See also 
Regolamento concernente la disciplina dell'accordo di integrazione tra lo stramero e lo 
stato, D.P.R. 14 settembre 2011, n. 179 (It.). 
63. Cuttitta, supra note 62, at 290. 
64. Dora Kostakopoulou, The Anatomy of Civic Integration, 73 MOD. L. REv. 
933, 935 (2010); Friso van Houdt et al., Neoliberal Communitarian Citizenship: Cur-
rent Trends Towards 'Earned Citizenship' in the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands,26 INT'L Soc. 408, 412-13 (2011). 
65. Paul Carrel, Germany Wants Refugees to Integrateor Lose Residency Rights, 
REUTERS (March 28, 2016, 9:07 AM), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-mi-
grants-germany-integration-idUSKCNOWU147> See also Janosch Delcker, Angela 
Merkel to refugees: Integration is a must, POLITIcO (May 25, 2016, 5:21 PM), <http:// 
www.politico.eu/article/angela-merket-to-refugees-integration-is-a-must-germany/> 
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Finally, in Denmark, the conditions for naturalization have also clearly 
become stricter since the 2000s.66 More specifically, the Danish language 
requirements for TCNs have been made more stringent in 2002, 2005, 
2008, and 2013 and have been installed along with a citizenship test and the 
obligation to sign a declaration of faithfulness and loyalty to Denmark. 
67 
Remarkably, in 2011, a new government revised certain parts of integration 
requirements, as it concluded that some of them had become overly restric-
tive. However, at its core, it did not abandon the shift to the individualized 
perspective of integration, as this government too emphasized it intended to 
send the signal "that foreigners . . . whose integration has been successful, 
can become Danish citizens. The requirements must be high, as Danish citi-
zenship is something special .... -"68 Integration remained something to be 
assessed solely on the individual level and is described as the standard for 
TCNs to deserve of belonging and be allowed to obtain citizenship. 
The aforementioned examples could be extended or described in more 
detail. However, for the purposes of this article it should be clearly demon-
strated that this legal tendency has played out and continues to play out in 
various Member States. If we compare the shift in legal integration require-
ments for TCNs in Member States with the conceptual shift on integration 
as expounded in Part I, we see that the parallel is striking. In a nutshell, 
the bulk of the changes in integration and citizenship policies in a growing 
number of European countries increasingly correspond with the following 
framework: TCNs after arrival are increasingly perceived as "non-inte-
grated individuals" who are positioned "outside of society" and trigger rela-
tively minor public responsibility. 
However, by their own effort, they may undergo a personal transfor-
mation and achieve a degree of "individualized integration" that can and 
should be tested by requiring them to pass examinations that assess their 
loyalty, behavior, and knowledge of the receiving state's language(s), his-
tory, values, and political institutions. Phrased differently, integration mea-
sures monitor, one might say, a test phase of three to five years in which 
TCNs should invest in and demonstrate their personal integration by com-
pleting a series of formalized integration tests and requirements. If they 
succeed, they have individually managed to become integrated, "to stand 
inside, and be compatible with, society" and therefore deserve to belong 
and earn rights. 
69 
66. MARC MoRiJ HOWARD, THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE 103 (2009). 
67. EVA ERSBOLL, REPORT ON CITIZENSHIP LAW: DENMARK 24-27 (2015). 
68. Id. at 29. 
69. Id. 
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IV. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE INTEGRATION DEMANDS 
This Part propounds that public integration policy based on individual-
ized integration conceptions are prone to clash with desirable societal out-
comes. First, research suggests that "integration requirements abroad" 
currently tend to delay, rather than facilitate, family migration. Indeed, 
Scholten et al. writes in a review of pre-departure integration measures in 
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Austria that "their integration ef-
fects thus far seem modest at best . . . and their . . . immigration effects 
more significant. '70 
Considering the shift towards integration requirements based on indi-
vidualized integration requirements in Europe, this is not surprising: it in-
creasingly made the purpose of integration policies to select, in the words of 
the Dutch minister, "integratable" immigrants.71 Nonetheless, in Part II, I 
discussed that applicants for family migration can successfully challenge 
Member States that perpetually obstruct their legal right to family migration 
(although the required legal procedures are, admittedly, time-consuming 
and in certain countries, difficult to access). From a long-term perspective, 
the main outcome of integration requirements abroad based on individual-
ized integration conceptions is, therefore, not that they permanently exclude 
most family migrants, nor that they carefully support integration processes. 
Instead, they chiefly inculcate the untrue and stigmatizing public perception 
that the human right to family reunification is something to be "earned" by 
certain types of immigrants, based on their compatibility with society. 72 
Secondly, integration requirements for permanent residency based on 
individualized integration conceptualizations carry the risk of generating a 
subclass of TCNs in society with limited packages of rights and socio-eco-
nomic perspectives. We have seen that if integration requirements begin to 
focus on limiting belonging to those who earn it, they tend to become more 
burdensome, exclusionary and punitive in order to prevent undeserved be-
longing of those TCNs that are, allegedly, un-integrated. Although this 
makes perfect sense from an individualized integration perspective, from a 
more long-term societal perspective, a mainly undesirable outcome results. 
TCNs that fail to integrate remain members of society-since EU and inter-
national law halts their expulsion-albeit in "feedback loops of conditional-
70. SCHOLTEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 39. 
71. Id. at 10. 
72. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE NETHERLANDS: DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE NAME OF INTEGRATION. MIGRANTS' RIGHTS UNDER THE INTEGRATION ABROAD ACT 
(2008), available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/14/netherlands-discrimina-
tion-name-integration>; Strik et al., supra note 17; Groenendijk, supra note 12. 
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ity. ' '73 They maintain a precarious legal status, confronted with fines and/or 
debts, and stigmatized as non-integrated migrants who do not belong. 
Moreover, in principle, they do not receive extra public supervision or care, 
but are merely pressured to retake their exams. 
This integration strategy thus increases, rather than decreases, the 
chances that these TCNs will become stranded in the margins of society-
particularly since empirical scholarship indicates that the group of TCNs 
who fail to integrate is predominately composed of the elderly, the largely 
uneducated and the illiterate, along with women in disadvantaged positions 
and traumatized refugees. 74 The Dutch House of Audit therefore recently 
observed that it is questionable as to whether punitive measures work at all 
if these vulnerable groups of TCNs fail to meet integration standards.
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Individualized integration conceptions create confusion about how to 
evaluate the quality of integration policies. In contrast, if integration re-
quirements are built on more collective perspectives of integration, the 
method of evaluating their quality is quite clear. If politicians are concerned 
about fostering certain social mechanisms, it follows that integration poli-
cies should be evaluated based on empirical research exploring whether cer-
tain policies in fact promote or jeopardize these mechanisms. Therefore, if 
it turns out that certain integration requirements hinder TCN participation in 
the labor market, or that much better outcomes could be achieved through 
alternative public integration strategies, for example, these requirements 
should be altered. 
Within the prevalent individualized perspectives on integration, this 
idea is not straightforward. For instance, low passing rates with respect to 
integration requirements are not understood to indicate that public integra-
tion measures are deficient and are generating societalproblems, but merely 
to demonstrate the integration problems of TCNs who do not belong-a 
situation exposed by well-constructed integration policies. To illustrate, 
when in 2016 it turned out that only 31.2% of newcomers in Denmark had 
completed the civic test, the minister responsible did not reflect on the qual-
ity of the Danish trajectory or examination, but stated that being Danish is 
indeed "something you-have to earn. 
' 76 
73. Goodman & Wright, supra note 27. 
74. VAN OERS, supra note 2, at 271. 
75. ALGEMENE REKENKAMER [THE NETHERLANDS COURT OF AUDIT], EERSTE 
RESULTATEN VAN DE WET INBURGERING [THE FIRST RESULTS OF THE INTEGRATION 
AcT] 2013 (2017), available at <https://www.rekenkamer.nl/publicaties/rapporten/ 
2017/01/24/inburgering> 
76. Dan Bilefsky, Denmark's Tougher Citizenship Tests Stumps Even Its Natives, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016)), availableat <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/world/ 
europe/denmark-citizenship-test.html?_r--0> 
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As soon as integration policies become premised on individualized in-
tegration conceptualizations, chances that they will be reevaluated and im-
proved if they have exclusionary effects (i.e., push TCNs in society into 
precarious positions) decline. Another example is that the Dutch liberal 
party (largest party in cabinet and also winner of the 2017 parliamentary 
election) continued to reemphasize that permanent residency and citizen-
ship should be earned after it turned out that less than 30% of TCNs in the 
Netherlands pass all integration requirements in time. In addition, they 
promised to find ways to circumvent existing EU and constitutional laws 
that prevent deportation and proceed to actually expel TCNs who fulfill the 
integration policies.77 Rather than discussing the disappointing integration 
outcomes in collective terms, these outcomes are interpreted as laying bare 
the integration problem of individual TCNs who actually should leave. 
The fourth counterproductive effect of the shift towards individualized 
integration conceptions is that it leads to integration trajectories that are 
remarkably less pro-active than they could, or should, be. This is the result 
of these conceptions relying on the idea that the responsibility to integrate 
lies solely on the shoulders of TCNs, because only they can integrate. This 
is a vital point, as it counters the frequent argument that non-punitive inte-
gration strategies that intensively supervise TCNs would be "too soft." 
Most European states seem to be convinced that creating the suggestion that 
newcomers must "earn" their rights by integrating is the "big stick" that 
receiving states can wield in order to compel newcomers to learn the na-
tional language and to become familiar with the political system.78 The 
most important contribution of the analysis provided in this article is to 
show that this suggestion is misguided. 
The main result of the shift towards individualized integration in Eu-
rope (rooted in concepts of "earned belonging"), is that it blurs the obvious 
public interest and responsibility that immigrant incorporation processes in 
society turn out well. To be more precise, it clouds the fact that TCNs who 
are mandated to integrate (i.e., family migrants and refugees) will in all 
probability settle in society, regardless of the threat to expel those who fail 
to integrate. As a result, the increasingly dominant idea that allegedly un-
integrated TCNs can be permanently excluded after a "test phase" of sev-
eral years is mainly, in the words of Julia Permoser, a form of "symbolic 
77. VOLKSPARTh VOOR VRIJHEID EN DEMOCRATIE [PEOPLE'S PARTY FOR FREE-
DOM AND DEMOCRACY], INTEGRATE AGENDA [INTEGRATION AGENDA] (2017), availa-
ble at <https://vvd.nl/content/uploads/2017/02/VVD-Integratie-Agenda-Malik-Azmani 
.pdf>. 
78. De Waal, supra note 39, at 168. 
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politics" that do not have the actual effect they promise, but aim to "[keep] 
the myth of sovereignty alive."
'79 
Nevertheless, these ideas do preclude European states from being, im-
mediately after the arrival of TCNs, fully dedicated to adopting the shared 
responsibility of creating the conditions that will optimally enable TCNs to 
contribute to society. Amongst other things, we have seen that the shift 
towards individualized integration strategies has motivated several Member 
States to cut public funding for language courses for TCNs, given that they 
must invest-financially and in terms of effort-in their personal capacity 
to "fit in" before they deserve public concern and budget. That being the 
case, if individualized integration strategies are to be relinquished-for in-
stance, by disconnecting integration strategies from laws that regulate resi-
dency and citizenship rights for refugees and family migrants-EU 
countries could fully explore the potential of more pro-active integration 
policies. 80 These policies would include a variety of customized mandatory 
courses, the funding of initiatives in civil society and collaboration with the 
business world, as well as websites that make it possible for newcomers to 
learn how things work in their new country, to hear about he national tradi-
tions and ways of life, to learn the nation's history, traditions, and its lan-
guages and ultimately, to feel welcome and able to participate fully in 
society. 
In weighing the importance of this argument, it is important to remem-
ber that the integration requirements for these groups formally do not serve 
to select their eligibility for migration or residency rights. Furthermore, if 
TCNs (i.e., refugees and TCNs) do not complete mandatory integration re-
quirements, it virtually never leads to their physical removal from the terri-
tory. For this reason, the main effect of the current integration requirements 
in Member States is that these TCNs remain within society with limited 
79. Mourdo Permoser, supra note 13, at 173-97. 
80. See, e.g., De Waal, supra note 39, at 139-163; see also Anna Goppel, Linguis-
tic Integration-Valuablebut Voluntary, 25 RES PUBLICA 55 (2017). In previous work, 
I have proposed that receiving EU liberal democracies should establish a new principle, 
namely to place a firewall between, on one hand, laws that regulate the allocation of 
rights to legal residency and citizenship to refugees and family migrants, and on the 
other, public strategies that monitor and encourage integration. The institutional attrib-
utes of this firewall are therefore quite straightforward: integration measures are in prin-
ciple legitimate, but they should institutionally and legally be decoupled from laws that 
supervise the residential inclusion and citizenship. Goppel criticizes the moral accepta-
bility of the requirement of linguistic integration and argues that all arguments often 
invoked in favor of integration requirements-that such requirements are proportional, 
are for the immigrants' own sake and that newcomers have agreed upon them upon 
entry to the country-must be rejected. 
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packages of rights, and limited socio-economic perspectives. Therefore, the 
mechanisms of control that result from the connection between integration 
policies and laws that regulate the residency and citizenship rights for fam-
ily migrants and refugees are actually relatively toothless, and mostly 
counterproductive. 
The fifth counterproductive effect is that integration policies based on 
individualized integration conceptualizations disregard the fact that it is di-
dactically disadvantageous to ask all TCNs to complete the same integra-
tion trajectory and to pass the same tests. 81 Surely, if one thinks that 
individual integration renders individuals worthy of secure rights and citi-
zenship, it is only fair that people are granted these rights under the same 
conditions. From this point of view, the meriting of belonging is compara-
ble to the obtaining of diplomas, which is based on reasons of fairness and 
on the same standards and tests. However, from a more societal perspective, 
the mainstreaming of integration requirements is not pragmatic at all. In-
stead, it seems worthwhile to develop customized approaches such as giv-
ing illiterate immigrants and those with university degrees different 
integration trajectories based on their didactical needs. 82 
Indeed, to illustrate this point, Van Oers draws an "integration spec-
trum." On the one side, there is the "Top End" existing of TCNs who are 
already highly educated and/or have strong social networks. For this group, 
she writes, integration requirements are often "belittling." 83 On the other 
side, there is the "Bottom End" (e.g. illiterates, traumatized refugees) for 
whom it is often simply impossible to pass integration requirements. 4 Yet, 
individualized integration conceptualizations predispose receiving states to 
approach all TCNs as persons who must individually prove themselves able 
to integrate into "us," instead of recognizing them as persons who require a 
variety of public interventions to achieve the best emancipatory outcomes. 
In this context, recent research also indicates that European cities have tra-
ditionally recognized that customized approaches to integration work best, 
and have developed the expertise to provide it. Cities are increasingly 
forced to mainstream their integration strategies by law made at the national 
level. These strategies are often governed by the broader shift towards the 
81. Along these lines, the CJEU also ruled in 2015 in the P and S case that Mem-
ber States should take into account "the level of knowledge required to pass the ... 
examination," and "specific individual circumstances, such as age, illiteracy or level of 
education." Case 579/13, supra note 23, at § 49. 
82. See, e.g., U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, A NEW BEGINNING: REFUGEE 
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE (2013), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/opera-
tions/52403d389/new-begin-ning-refugee-integration-europe.html> 
83. VAN OERS, supra note 2, at 270. 
84. Id. at 271. 
2018-2019] "Make Sure You Belong!" 
idea that all TCNs must demonstrate their individual integration to merit 
rights, which in turn leads to policies that are measurably less effective than 
their previous, more customized ones.
8 5 
Finally, if EU countries indeed abandon individualized integration 
strategies and explore the opportunities offered by customized integration 
policies, the question arises as to why integration trajectories in EU coun-
tries are most often closed off for other groups in society such as internal 
EU immigrants. After all, all arguments in favor of integration trajectories 
for TCNs, seen as a field of public policy facilitating sets of desirable socie-
tal outcomes (e.g. equal participation, enhancing language fluency, demo-
cratic socialization) apply to this group as well.8 6 Of course, internal EU 
migrants cannot be obliged to complete integration standards in order to 
deserve belonging (i.e., to obtain, renew, or increase their residency rights). 
But this is only relevant if integration is fully understood as a personal 
condition of non-EU migrants. 
It leaves untouched the fact that if integration is perceived as a public 
concern, it seems a reasonable option for receiving states to provide ongo-
ing courses for all who might benefit from them-perhaps free of cost, or 
otherwise at low prices. One could argue that this would be costly. None-
theless, from a societal perspective, it seems at least worth exploring. If 
negative societal consequences and public costs are to be prevented in the 
long term (e.g. increased welfare dependency, unemployment, etc.), install-
ing effective integration trajectories for different new groups in society 
might in fact be lucrative, and prove to be the best strategy for society as a 
whole. 
Accordingly, the same could be argued about citizens who are disad-
vantaged due to low language levels. For example, we saw the Netherlands 
heavily approaches integration concerns through individualized conceptual-
izations, leading to seeing only low language levels on the side of newcom-
ers as a pressing issue. However, 12% of the Dutch population is also 
functionally illiterate, which can he roughly defined as being ill-equipped to 
85. See, e.g., Patrick Simon & M6lodie Beaujeu, Mainstreamingand Redefining 
the ImmigrantIntegrationDebate in Old MigrationCountries:A CaseStudy of France, 
the UK and the Netherlands, in MAINSTREAMING INTEGRATION GovERNANCE: NEW 
TRENDS IN MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE 25 (Peter Scholten & Ilona van 
Breugel eds., 2018). 
86. For example, the WRR wrote in a report on internal EU migration that if 
Polish and Bulgarian immigrants that (most probably) settle are offered education, lan-
guage training and labor market supervision, unemployment could be prevented. See 
WRR, IN BETERE BANEN 27 (2017), available at <https://www.wrr.nl/publicaties/ 
verkenningen/2012/12/12/in-betere-banen> 
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participate in the labor market due to being unable to read longer text. 87 
From a societal integration perspective, installing language strategies only 
for newcomers therefore seems ineffective. Therefore, it is worth exploring 
whether there would be better results if language courses were structurally 
provided and open to all residents in society, citizen or not, who may bene-
fit from them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In essence, the analysis presented in this article indicates that EU states 
should carefully avoid basing their integration strategies on individualized 
integration conceptions, as this carries great risk of leading to counter-
productive public policies supervising immigrant incorporation processes in 
society. Nevertheless, European integration policies are increasingly evalu-
ated based on the benchmark of whether they sufficiently assess when indi-
vidual TCNs have "integrated enough" to deserve belonging, instead of on 
their measurable effects on social mechanisms. This makes integration mea-
sures less pro-active, and creates disorientation with regard to when integra-
tion policies are effective in achieving societal goals (e.g. finding the most 
effective policies to enhance language levels of members in society, encour-
aging democratic socialization, stimulating participation, etc.). 
Integration measures have proliferated across European states. Yet, 
taking a closer look, these policies have only to a limited extent been the 
result of careful policy making with the purpose to genuinely promote the 
integration-in terms of a set of societal processes-of newcomers who 
will most likely settle permanently. On that account, this article demon-
strates that integration measures in EU countries should be less associated 
with the question of "who earns the right to belong here?" and redirected 
instead towards the question of "if newcomers join society, what public 
issues might this raise, and what state policies would demonstrably work to 
adequately address these?" This would make a catalogue of possible inte-
gration strategies conceivable, to be evaluated on the basis of their impact 
on societal outcomes, which are customized to the specific needs and capac-
ities of individual TCNs (and also to other groups in society such as EU 
migrants and citizens). This would better ensure that the integration strate-
87. Moreover, recent research by PricewaterhouseCoopers indicates that func-
tional illiteracy costs the Dutch economy C572 million a year. Laaggeletterden lopen 
jaarlijksruim halfmiljardaan inkomsten mis [IlliteratePeople Miss Out on over Halfa 
Billion of Revenu a Year], SICrrrG LEZEN & SCHRIJVEN [THE READ & WRITE FOUN-
DATION] (Apr. 4, 2018), availableat <https://www.lezenenschrijven.nl/nieuws/laaggel 
etterden-lopen-jaarlijks-ruim-half-miljard-aan-inkomsten-mis/> 
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gies of Member States have inclusionary instead of exclusionary effects 
and, moreover, are in line with the EU directives that give Member States 
the discretion to install mandatory integration requirements. 

